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Abstract 
Using annual bilateral data over the period 1988-2011 for a panel of 24 industrialised 
and emerging economies, we analyse in a time-varying framework the determinants of 
output synchronisation in EMU (European Monetary Union) distinguishing between 
core and peripheral member states. The results support the specialisation paradigm 
rather than the endogeneity hypothesis. Evidence is found in the euro period of 
diverging patterns between the core and the peripheral EMU countries raising questions 
about the future stability of EMU. 
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1. Introduction 
The euro zone sovereign debt crisis following the recent financial turmoil has raised 
again the question of the sustainability of EMU and whether in its current form it can be 
considered an optimal currency area (OCA). In fact a number of recent studies (Chen et 
al., 2012; Schmitz and von Hagen, 2009; Sinn et al., 2011) concluded that during its 
first decade imbalances between member states and differences in business cycle 
patterns in the core and in the periphery increased.  
As is well known, OCA theories (Mundell, 1961; McKinnon, 1963; Kenen, 
1969) argue that the degree of synchronisation of national business cycles is an 
indicator of the cost of adopting a common currency and relinquishing monetary policy 
independence: the more synchronised they are, the more effective a common monetary 
policy is. Therefore, from a financial stability perspective, output synchronisation has 
crucial implications in the context of EMU, reducing the likelihood of asymmetric 
responses to shocks and thus increasing the effectiveness of “one fits all” ECB policies. 
OCAs theories, however, do not provide formal criteria to evaluate whether the 
timing of the various steps necessary to create a currency area can be considered 
optimal, neither do they specify unique measures of the potential gains and losses. 
Individual OCA properties (e.g. labour and capital markets integration, price flexibility) 
as well as meta-properties aggregating several criteria have been considered. In the case 
of EMU, the positive impact of trade flows on output synchronisation predicted by 
Frankel and Rose (1998) has been analysed mainly in its very early stages (see the 
survey by Barbosa and Alves, 2011) – surprisingly, despite their availability, longer 
runs of data have not been used to test for long-run effects.  
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The present study aims to fill this gap. Specifically, it draws on three different, 
though related, strands of empirical research. The first has examined the so-called 
“nominal convergence” criterion (Haug et al., 2000; von Hagen and Neumann, 1994; 
Antonucci and Girardi, 2006), highlighting some heterogeneity among countries in 
Stage III of the process of European integration. In particular, Haug et al. (2000) 
predicted potential problems in the long run for some peripheral countries (Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain) with the need for “potentially painful long-run policy adjustments 
and reforms” (Haug et al., 2000; p. 431).  
A second strand has analysed the real aspects of monetary integration and the 
degree of synchronisation of national business cycles. Fatás (1997), using annual 
employment growth rates for various regions of France, Germany, Italy and the United 
Kingdom, found that the average correlation with aggregate EU-12 employment growth 
was higher in the period 1979-1992 than in previous one, 1966–1979. Similarly, 
Angeloni and Dedola (1999) reported that the output correlation between Germany and 
other European countries increased during the period 1993-1997, whilst Furceri and 
Karras (2006) estimated a higher business-cycle synchronisation for many countries in 
1992-2003 compared to 1980-1991. Despite this evidence, the general overall 
conclusion emerging from more recent studies is that the “euro effect” on euro zone 
business cycles has been weak (Enders et al., 2010) or even null (Canova et al., 2009; 
Del Negro and Otrok, 2008; Giannone et al., 2009).  
A third strand has stemmed from the heated debate between advocates of trade 
“specialisation” (Krugman, 1993; Krugman and Venables, 1996) theories and of the 
“endogeneity” hypothesis (Frankel and Rose, 1998) respectively. Economic theory does 
not provide unique predictions: stronger linkages could result either in a higher or a 
3 
 
lower degree of business cycle co-movement depending on whether or not demand- and 
supply-side effects dominate over increased specialisation of production (Baxter and 
Kouparitsas, 2005; Imbs, 2006). In particular, the “specialisation” paradigm postulates 
that as countries become more integrated, their industrial structure develops according 
to their comparative advantages (Bayoumi and Eichengreen, 1996), and thus the 
economy of each member country of an OCA becomes more vulnerable to supply 
shocks. By contrast, according to the endogenous view of OCAs the positive link 
between income correlation and trade integration is magnified for countries joining a 
currency union, and therefore the conditions for an OCA might be satisfied ex-post even 
if they were not met ex-ante. 
This paper, using annual bilateral data over the period 1988-2011 for a panel of 
24 industrialised and emerging economies, contributes to the existing literature in three 
ways. First, unlike the existing studies covering a short time period after the launch of 
EMU, it analyses how the integration process affected output synchronisation over more 
than a decade. Such a time span is indeed necessary to capture the long-term 
developments induced by a monetary union, such as trade integration (De Santis and 
Vicarelli, 2007). Second, it adopts a time-varying framework to analyse the 
determinants of output synchronisation as previously done only in a few relevant studies 
(Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2009; Imbs, 2010; Caporale and Girardi, 2012). Third, it 
distinguishes between core and peripheral economies and is therefore able to contribute 
to the debate on the ”endogeneity” properties of EMU. 
We show that the introduction of the euro has been associated with a decreasing 
role for trade intensity as a factor for output synchronisation within EMU. Furthermore, 
diverging patterns have emerged for the core and the periphery respectively which could 
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represent severe obstacles to the well-functioning of EMU and raise questions about its 
future stability. The fact that more intense intra-EMU trade flows did not lead to greater 
convergence in economic developments across the euro area suggests that a higher 
degree of economic policy coordination between the euro area members is needed. 
This paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the empirical strategy is 
outlined. Sections 3 describe the dataset. Section 4 discusses the results of the time-
varying analysis of the relationship between trade intensity and output synchronisation, 
as well as the evidence based on a number of alternative specifications. Section 5 offers 
some concluding remarks.  
 
2. The empirical strategy 
Since the study of Frankel and Rose (1998) a large body of empirical research (Clark 
and van Wincoop 2001; Calderon et al. 2007; among others) has shown that bilateral 
trade flows (ݐݎܽ) can affect output synchronisation (ߩ) across countries and/or regions. 
Following this literature, a canonical regression model can be specified as  
ߩ ൌ ߮ଵݐݎܽ ൅ ߝ        (1) 
The positive effect of bilateral trade flows on the degree of international 
business cycle synchronisation has been widely confirmed in the most recent literature 
even when controlling for other possible determinants, such as capital flows or industry 
specialisation (Imbs, 2004, 2010, Baxter and Kouparitsas 2005, Böwer and 
Guillemineau, 2006, Inklaar et al., 2008). 
However, standard international business cycle models have difficulty in 
matching the Frankel and Rose (1998) empirical results, leading to a “trade-
comovement puzzle” (Kose and Yi 2006). According to standard theory, trade intensity 
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has an ambiguous effect on the co-movement of output. Openness to trade will lead to 
increased specialisation in production and inter-industry patterns of international trade. 
If business cycles are dominated by industry-specific shocks, trade-induced 
specialisation leads to decreasing business cycle correlations. However, if trade is 
dominated by intra-industry trade industry-specific shocks may lead to more symmetric 
business cycles. Consequently, the positive link between trade and business cycle 
synchronisation is often seen as an indication that intra-industry dominates inter-
industry trade as a spillover channel for shocks.1  
When testing condition (1) empirically, output synchronisation is typically 
measured by filtering variables measuring the level of activity (i.e. real output or 
industrial production indices) over a selected window, ranging from a few years (Mathy 
and Meissner, 2011) to several decades (Frenkel and Rose, 1998). Here instead we 
follow Giannone et al. (2009) and measure the degree of synchronisation as the negative 
of divergence in growth rates, defined as the absolute value of GDP (ݕ) differences 
between country ݅ and ݆ in a given year ݐ: 
ߩ௜௧
ሺ௧ሻ ൌ െቚ∆ ln ݕ௜
ሺ௧ሻ െ ∆ln ݕ௝
ሺ௧ሻቚ      (2) 
This index is not subject to the criticism of various filtering methods and makes 
it possible to assess the degree of output synchronisation on a year-by-year basis rather 
than as an average of multi-year windows.  
Concerning trade intensity, we follow Frankel and Rose (1998) and employ total 
trade between two countries scaled by total GDP or total trade. Accordingly, we 
compute (a time-varying version of) bilateral trade intensities as  
                                                            
1 For the specific case of euro area, intra-industry is found to be very relevant by Di Giovanni and 
Levchenko (2010). 
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ݐݎܽ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ ൌ
௫೔ೕ
ሺ೟ሻା௠೔ೕ
ሺ೟ሻ
௭೔
ሺ೟ሻା௭ೕ
ሺ೟ሻ         (3) 
where ݐ is a time index, ݔ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ denotes total merchandise exports from the ݅-th (reporting) 
EMU economy to its j-th trading partner (namely the rest of EMU countries as well as 
other relevant economies taken as a control group), ݔ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ represents total imports of the ݅-
th EMU country from its ݆-th trading partner, and ݖ௜
ሺ௧ሻ and ݖ௝
ሺ௧ሻ are the nominal GDP 
levels in the two economies.  
While the qualitative conclusions concerning the impact of trade on income 
correlation are generally not dependent on the exact measure chosen (i.e. Calderon et 
al., 2007; Inklaar et al., 2008), the main problem in correctly estimating it is that trade 
intensity is endogenous. This makes simple ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions of 
bilateral economic activity correlation on trade intensity inappropriate. Frankel and 
Rose (1998) deal with this problem by using gravity variables (i.e. shared border, 
common language dummies or log-values of distance) as instruments to identify the 
effect of trade on business cycle correlation. Owing to the endogeneity of trade, 
instrumental variables (IV) techniques are commonly employed in order to identify 
accurately the effects of trade on business cycle co-movement.  
In contrast to the empirical literature started by Frenkel and Rose (1998) 
estimating condition (1) over a span of several years, we run for each country pairs ݆݅ a 
sequence of cross-sectional regressions based on the following fixed effects model: 
ߩ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ଵ߮
ሺ௧ሻ ݐݎܽ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ ൅ ߝ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ      (4) 
for ݐ ൌ 1, … , ܶ, where ߙ௜ collects the fixed country effects. Condition (4) sheds light on 
whether and how the relationship between trade intensity and output synchronisation 
might have changed over time, and therefore on the real effects of monetary integration. 
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In order to analyse them in greater depth, we also run several regression with interaction 
effects 
ߩ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ ଵ߮
ሺ௧ሻሺܫ௞ሻݐݎܽ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ ൅ ߮ଶ
ሺ௧ሻ ሺ1 െ ܫ௞ሻݐݎܽ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ ൅ ߮ଷ
ሺ௧ሻܫ௞ ൅ ߝ௜௝
ሺ௧ሻ  (5) 
with ݇ ൌ 1, … ,5 where the ݇-th binary indicator takes value one (and zero otherwise) 
for: (a) pairs of countries both belonging to EMU (݇ ൌ 1), in order to disentangle 
genuine intra-area effects from the influence of extra-EMU developments; (b) pairs of 
countries both in EMU but with the reporting economy being a core European country 
(݇ ൌ 2) or a peripheral European country (݇ ൌ 3) respectively, in order to investigate 
whether there are diverging patterns between core and peripheral countries as recently 
shown by Lehwald (2012); and (c) pairs of countries both in the core (݇ ൌ 4) or in the 
peripheral EMU (݇ ൌ 5) respectively, as would be implied by a two-speed Europe, with 
only Germany, its smaller neighbours (including Austria), and France forming a viable 
monetary union (see von Hagen and Neumann, 1994). 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
Data on bilateral trade are taken from the IMF’s Direction of Trade Statistics (DOTS) 
database for bilateral exports and imports in US dollar terms. Our preferred measure of 
real economic activity is real GDP, and the relevant series have been obtained from the 
OECD Structural Analysis (STAN) database. The data are annual and span the period 
from 1988 to 2011. 
The reporting countries are the following EMU member states: Austria, Belgium 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. 2 
                                                            
2 1999 marks the beginning of the euro period for all countries but Greece, who joined in 2001. Given the 
small size of their economies relative to the euro area as a whole, the omission of later entrants (namely 
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The partner economies are the same countries listed above as well as industrialised 
(Australia, Canada, Denmark, Japan, Korea, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the UK and the US) and emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, 
Russian Federation) as a control group named Rest of the World (ROW). Following the 
literature (von Hagen and Neumann, 1994; Caporale and Girardi, 2011) we define 
Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany and the Netherlands as “core” and Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain as peripheral EMU countries, respectively. 
Table 1 reports some descriptive statistics for the variables employed in the 
empirical analysis for the full sample of countries as well as for several sub-groups 
identified according to the criteria discussed in Section 2 above. As expected, EMU 
country pairs exhibit a larger degree of synchronisation in real activity. Moreover, 
output developments in core EMU countries appear to be closely related to those in 
their EMU partners, especially in the other core EMU members. By contrast, the 
peripheral countries exhibit a much lower degree of output synchronisation and a much 
higher level of variability.  
[Table 1] 
Figure 1 (Panel A) plots the evolution of output synchronisation over the time 
span considered, by distinguishing patterns for EMU country pairs and for the EMU 
members vis-à-vis the ROW. On average, a “Europe” rather than a “euro” effect can be 
detected: a higher degree of output co-movements for EMU pairs can be observed more 
clearly during the years before the start of Stage III of EMU rather than after the 
introduction of the euro. However, differences between core and peripheral countries 
                                                                                                                                                                              
Slovenia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta) should not affect the results significantly. A similar choice has 
been made by Caporale and Girardi (2011), among others. 
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(Panel B and C, respectively) emerge, notably a relative increase in output 
synchronisation for the core countries with respect to the rest of the euro area and to the 
other core countries, except for the year 1991, which marks German reunification. In the 
peripheral countries, output synchronisation decreases in relative terms with respect to 
both the euro area and the other peripheral countries. 
[Figure 1] 
As for trade patterns, Figure 2 largely confirm the trends described above for 
output synchronisation. When comparing EMU pairs with respect to the ROW, 
however, the positive “Europe” effect over the whole period is reinforced by a “euro” 
effect starting from 2003 (Panel A). Again, different patterns can be observed for the 
core and peripheral countries (Panel B and C, respectively): the lack of flexible 
exchange rates and of an independent monetary policy as well as fiscal policy 
constraints appear to have generated asymmetric responses of the core and the periphery 
to external shocks. 
[Figure 2] 
 
4. The econometric analysis 
4.1. Estimation results 
The stylised facts discussed above corroborate the view of the lack of an “euro” effect 
reducing asymmetries in business cycle developments within EMU (Enders et al., 2010; 
Canova et al., 2009; Del Negro and Otrok, 2008; Giannone et al., 2009). Interestingly, 
our evidence indicates that, despite the increase in trade intensity after the launch of the 
euro, diverging patterns in real activity and heterogenous behaviour in trade flows can 
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be detected. This finding supports the specialisation paradigm of Krugman (1993) rather 
than the endogeneity hypothesis of Frankel and Rose (1998).3  
In order to gain a deeper understanding of the output-trade linkage, we estimate 
models (4) and (5) as a sequence of fixed effect cross-sectional regressions for each year 
from 1988 to 2011. To address the endogeneity issue of trade intensity we use as 
external instruments, following the traditional gravity approach, the (log of) distance 
and its squared term, the presence of a common border and common languages, the (log 
of) the size of the partner country and a dummy for tariffs proxied by the membership to 
WTO (source: CEPII and WTO).4 Moreover, as the residual ߝ௜௝ may suffer from 
possible heteroscedasticity owing to measurement errors specific to a given country ݆, 
we follow Imbs (2010) and control for this possibility via clustering of the residual 
along the reporting country dimension.  
Tables A.1-A.6 in the Appendix report the fixed effect estimates, with 
coefficients in bold and italics indicating statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent 
nominal level (or better), respectively. In brief, the coefficient associated with trade 
intensity is found to be positive and statistically significant in the majority of cases. 
Furthermore, according to the p-values associated to the Hansen-J statistics the 
instruments are uncorrelated with the disturbances.  
While useful to assess possible time-varying effects in the trade-output nexus, 
the estimation results in Tables A.1-A.6, the outcome of ܶ ൈ ሺ݇ ൅ 1ሻ ൌ 144 different 
                                                            
3 According to theory, the effect of trade intensity on output co-movement is ambiguous. Close trade 
relations between countries may affect the business cycle through demand fluctuations, as changes in 
income in one country will normally also lead to a change in the demand for foreign goods.  
4 All instruments are taken from: http://www.cepii.fr/CEPII/en/bdd_modele/presentation.asp?id=8. 
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fixed effects models, is clearly hard to interpret. Moreover, year-by-year estimations of 
the impact of trade intensity on output synchronisation are likely to be influenced by 
shocks hitting the system in a specific year. In order to provide an overview of the 
results, we analyse the time series averages of the yearly slopes, along with their 
standard errors corrected for serial correlation as suggested by Petersen (2009).5 
According to the results in Table 2, in the period 1988-2011 the average 
relationship between trade intensity and output synchronisation for the EMU countries 
and the ROW is positive and highly significant, in line with the empirical literature 
surveyed by de Haan et al. (2007). Since the trade intensity measure is expressed in 
logarithms and the dependent variable in percentage points, the estimates in Table 2 can 
be interpreted as semi-elasticities. For instance, the coefficient of about 0.65 for the full 
sample implies that an increase in bilateral trade intensity of one percent (roughly the 
value of its sample standard deviation as reported in Table 1) leads to an average 
increase in output synchronisation of 0.7. Given the (absolute) median value of output 
synchonisation of 1.7 (see Table 1), these are significant effects in economic terms as 
well.  
[Table 2] 
4.2 Rolling averages 
The aggregate picture, however, could hide some dynamic heterogeneity in the trade-
output relationship. With this in mind, we analyse the behaviour of the coefficient over 
time, through rolling averages (over a 5-year window) of the estimated coefficients in 
                                                            
5 More formally, let ߚሺ௧ሻ be a time series of the estimated slope, with ݐ ൌ 1, … , ܶ. Its average value is 
given by ଵ
்
∑ ߚሺ௧ሻ்௜ୀଵ , whilst its corrected standard error is given by 
ଵାఏ
ଵିఏ
ߪଶ, where the variance ߪଶ is equal 
to the (square of) the standard deviation of ߚ divided by √ܶ, where ߠ ൌ ܿ݋ݎݎሺߚሺ௧ሻ, ߚሺ௧ିଵሻሻ. 
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Tables A.1-A.6. Considering the whole period (Figure 3), it can be seen that the rolling 
estimates of ߛଵ in model (4) lie in the interval between 0.5 and 1.1. Interestingly, before 
1999 there was a decreasing trend in this coefficient, followed by stability.  
[Figure 3] 
To shed further light on these findings we extend the baseline model (4) by 
discriminating between EMU country pairs and ROW economies. The rolling estimates 
for the coefficients ߛଵ (solid line) and ߛଶ (dashed line) of specification (5), with ݇ ൌ 1, 
are presented in Figure 4. After an increase in the average value in the pre-euro period, a 
slightly declining trend can be observed more recently. In particular, the effect of trade 
intensity on output synchronisation within the EMU appears to have declined in the  
euro period. This behaviour is consistent with the historical European experience, with 
trade relationships between countries being affected not only by past investment in 
export-oriented infrastructure, but also by the accumulation of invisible assets such as 
political, cultural and geographical factors influencing commercial transactions within 
this area. Close trade linkages characterised the economies adopting the euro even 
previously (De Nardis et al., 2008a, 2008b). 
[Figure 4] 
To obtain more disaggregate results we re-run model (5) distinguishing between 
EMU core and peripheral countries. Panel A and B of Figure 5 report the estimates of 
ߛଵand ߛଶfor the case of ݇ ൌ 2 (dashed lines) and ݇ ൌ 3 (dotted lines), respectively. The 
estimates of the former are very similar for both sub-groups, suggesting that trade 
shocks originating outside EMU produce similar responses in both. By contrast, the 
coefficient ߛଵ appears to be fairly stable in the core countries but very unstable in the 
peripheral ones, where it is increasing before the introduction of the euro and decreasing 
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afterwards. Therefore, the declining trend in the semi-elasticities for EMU country pairs 
of Figure 4 can be ascribed almost entirely to the peripheral EMU countries. 
[Figure 5] 
Similar evidence is provided by Figure 6, where the ߛଵ and ߛଶ coefficients for 
EMU core and periphery country pairs, that is model (5) with ݇ ൌ 4 (dashed lines) and 
݇ ൌ 5 (dotted lines) respectively, are presented. These findings suggest the existence in 
the euro period of both output synchronisation (see, for instance, Lehwald, 2012) and 
more structural differences. More specifically, it seems that trade intensity has led to 
higher business cycle correlation only among the core countries, but not in the case of 
the periphery. Structural factors (such as inter- versus intra-industry trade) not included 
in our empirical framework could account for this phenomenon. However, on the whole 
it is clear that, after more than a decade from the launch of the EMU, trade flows within 
the area are having a decreasing effect on the business cycle correlation between 
member states, i.e. the endogeneity mechanism has not been very effective. This is 
consistent with the evidence based on pre-euro data (Haug et al., 2000; von Hagen and 
Neumann, 1994), and favours the specialisation theory of Krugman (1993) rather than 
the endogeneity hypothesis of Frankel and Rose (1998).  
[Figure 6] 
4.3 Robustness 
To assess the robustness of the finding of a declining effect of trade intensity on output 
synchronisation in the euro period, we also consider three alternative specifications to 
models (4) and (5).6 First we estimate regressions where the indicator of output 
synchronisation is based on industrial production instead of GDP growth rates. As 
                                                            
6 Complete estimation results are available on request. 
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pointed out by Imbs (2010), the former is an imperfect measure of overall economic 
activity, capturing only a share of it. Moreover, it largely abstracts from non-traded 
goods. Since our analysis covers periods of turmoil (i.e. the European Monetary System 
breakdown, the Asian crisis and the recent global financial crisis), a measure focusing 
on traded goods (as in the case of GDP) is more appropriate. The results are 
qualitatively similar to those discussed in Section 4.2: the semi-elasticities for trade 
intensity are positive and statistically significant in the vast majority of year-by-year 
regressions; the effect of trade intensity on output synchronisation within EMU is 
slightly declining in the euro period; a symmetric response of output synchronisation to 
trade shocks originating outside EMU is again found for EMU core and peripheral 
countries; in the peripheral EMU economies the trade-output nexus is not stable, 
increasing before the introduction of the euro and declining afterwards.  
The other two robustness checks are based on using different trade intensity 
measures. Following Frankel and Rose (1998) we construct alternative indicators as 
follows: a) by scaling the numerator of (3) by the sum of total imports and exports 
instead of the sum of nominal GDP of the generic pair ݆݅; b) by using only exports when 
computing the alternative indicator given by a). Again, the general conclusions arising 
from the baseline model estimate are largely confirmed.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis has raised some doubts about the euro zone being an OCA. 
This paper analyses how trade integration has affected output synchronisation since the 
introduction of the euro using bilateral annual data over the period 1988-2011 for a 
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panel of 24 industrialised and emerging economies. This is a crucial issue for the 
effectiveness of a single monetary policy and financial stability. 
Our findings show that the relationships between trade intensity and output 
synchronisation is positive and statistically significant (with a few exceptions). 
Moreover, the evidence of a declining effect over time, and in the euro years in 
particular, supports the specialisation model of Krugman (1993) in preference to the 
endogeneity hypothesis of Frankel and Rose (1998). Further, the increasing divergence 
between the core and the periphery raises questions about the future stability of EMU. It 
appears that more intense intra-EMU trade flows do not guarantee greater convergence 
in economic developments across the euro area. From a policy perspective, this calls for 
a higher degree of coordination between the euro area members. 
Further interesting issues to be addressed are whether a smaller set of countries 
would qualify as an OCA and whether structural factors (such as inter- versus intra-
industry trade) would explain better the endogeneity properties of the EMU. These 
questions are beyond the scope of the present paper and will be the subject of future 
research. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 – Descriptive statistics 
 
 Output synchronisation 
 N mean median sd min max 
Full sample 7106 -2.5034 -1.7110 2.5329 -18.3963 -0.0005 
EMU pairs 2630 -1.8431 -1.3004 1.8321 -11.1695 -0.0006 
Core vis-à-vis EMU 1435 -1.6189 -1.1469 1.7021 -11.1695 -0.0006 
Periphery vis-à-vis EMU 1195 -2.1125 -1.5584 1.9438 -10.4630 -0.0037 
Core EMU pairs 715 -1.2960 -0.9749 1.4037 -11.1695 -0.0006 
Periphery EMU pairs 480 -2.3694 -1.8624 1.9736 -8.5126 -0.0179 
 Trade intensity 
 N mean median sd min max 
Full sample 7074 0.0061 0.0023 0.0105 0.0000 0.1345 
EMU pairs 2630 0.0105 0.0048 0.0149 0.0002 0.1345 
Core vis-à-vis EMU 1435 0.0142 0.0063 0.0184 0.0008 0.1345 
Periphery vis-à-vis EMU 1195 0.0060 0.0032 0.0067 0.0002 0.0368 
Core EMU pairs 715 0.0212 0.0098 0.0229 0.0016 0.1345 
Periphery EMU pairs 480 0.0043 0.0023 0.0051 0.0002 0.0254 
 
Output synchronisation is given by condition (2) in the main text and is measured as the negative of 
divergence in growth rates, defined as the absolute value of GDP differences between country ݅ and ݆ in a 
given year ݐ. Trade intensity is given by condition (3) in the main text and is measured as the ratio of the 
sum of exports to and the ݅-th EMU country and its ݆-th trading partner, scaled by the sum of their 
nominal GDP levels. Sub-samples are defined in Section 2 of the main text. 
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Table 2 – Temporal aggregation of year-by-year estimates 
 
EMU vs all 
γ1  0.5342 (0.2211) 
EMU pairs vs extra-EMU partners 
γ1  0.5927 (0.0672) 
γ2  0.6319 (0.1276) 
γ3  −0.0312 (0.6353) 
Core EMU countries vs EMU and extra-EMU partners 
γ1  0.5585 (0.0650) 
γ2  0.6389 (0.1127) 
γ3  −0.1504 (0.6172) 
Peripheral EMU countries vs EMU and extra-EMU partners 
γ1  0.5527 (0.1564) 
γ2  0.6683 (0.1021) 
γ3  −0.6241 (0.8587) 
Core EMU country pairs vs other EMU and non-EMU partners 
γ1  0.4630 (0.0943) 
γ2  0.6528 (0.1130) 
γ3  −0.6374 (0.7247) 
Peripheral EMU country pairs vs other EMU and non-EMU partners 
γ1  0.5342 (0.2211) 
γ2  0.6691 (0.0988) 
γ3  −0.7935 (1.0376) 
 
Time series averages of the yearly slopes reported in Tables A1-A6 of the Appendix. Coefficients in bold 
and italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent nominal level (or better), respectively. 
Standard errors corrected by serial correlation according to Petersen (2009) in parentheses.  
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 – EMU countries vs all partners 
 
γ1  N jp 
1988 0.8346 (0.0919) 275 [0.130] 
1989 0.1032 (0.0516) 275 [0.095] 
1990 0.6019 (0.0577) 286 [0.173] 
1991 -0.1319 (0.1195) 286 [0.107] 
1992 0.9101 (0.1089) 289 [0.220] 
1993 1.5205 (0.1794) 296 [0.104] 
1994 1.4579 (0.1307) 296 [0.092] 
1995 0.9165 (0.1137) 297 [0.095] 
1996 0.6606 (0.1387) 297 [0.092] 
1997 0.1497 (0.1163) 297 [0.095] 
1998 0.9185 (0.0733) 297 [0.096] 
1999 0.4798 (0.1097) 297 [0.094] 
2000 0.6695 (0.1407) 297 [0.097] 
2001 0.3513 (0.0854) 297 [0.097] 
2002 0.5139 (0.1494) 297 [0.169] 
2003 0.6495 (0.1759) 297 [0.119] 
2004 0.5285 (0.0970) 297 [0.097] 
2005 0.5209 (0.1033) 297 [0.096] 
2006 0.5207 (0.0745) 297 [0.093] 
2007 0.6409 (0.0661) 297 [0.090] 
2008 0.7073 (0.0702) 297 [0.092] 
2009 1.0700 (0.0704) 297 [0.133] 
2010 0.6340 (0.0929) 297 [0.100] 
2011 0.4778 (0.0798) 297 [0.098] 
 
Fixed effects IV estimation results of model (4), with distance (and its squared term), common border, 
common languages, the (log of) the size of the partner country and membership to WTO as external 
instruments. Coefficients in bold and italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 percent 
nominal level (or better), respectively. Robust standard errors obtained via clustering of the residual along 
the reporting country dimension in parentheses. p-value associated to the Hansen-J statistics for the null 
of no correlation between instruments and the disturbance process (jp) in square brackets.  
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Table A.2 – EMU pairs vs non-EMU partners 
 
γ1  γ2  γ3  N jp 
1988 0.2251 (0.1114) 0.6291 (0.1467) -0.8564 (0.7443) 275 [0.147] 
1989 0.0914 (0.0995) -0.3155 (0.0702) 3.5673 (0.4188) 275 [0.147] 
1990 0.6225 (0.1421) 0.4717 (0.1511) 1.1665 (0.9586) 286 [0.271] 
1991 0.3199 (0.1853) -0.9924 (0.3104) 9.5454 (1.5071) 286 [0.146] 
1992 0.8784 (0.0954) 0.8166 (0.1457) 0.7014 (0.8233) 289 [0.295] 
1993 0.7058 (0.2114) 1.6382 (0.2056) -4.8291 (1.3840) 296 [0.157] 
1994 0.9510 (0.1661) 1.5040 (0.1648) -2.6786 (1.2402) 296 [0.140] 
1995 0.9433 (0.1362) 0.9347 (0.1305) 0.0565 (0.9991) 297 [0.152] 
1996 0.8641 (0.2267) 0.8166 (0.1556) -0.3117 (1.1926) 297 [0.143] 
1997 0.6884 (0.2422) 0.1709 (0.1508) 2.3709 (0.8633) 297 [0.162] 
1998 0.5215 (0.1919) 1.1018 (0.1596) -3.3284 (0.6976) 297 [0.158] 
1999 0.5226 (0.1489) 0.5503 (0.1960) -0.3381 (0.9816) 297 [0.172] 
2000 0.7943 (0.1426) 0.8990 (0.2166) -1.2864 (1.0463) 297 [0.160] 
2001 0.3497 (0.1218) 0.4174 (0.1113) -0.5501 (0.3451) 297 [0.151] 
2002 0.6774 (0.1555) 0.6326 (0.1682) -0.1787 (0.8087) 297 [0.281] 
2003 0.9220 (0.1988) 0.7665 (0.1726) 0.2827 (1.0552) 297 [0.194] 
2004 0.4433 (0.1067) 0.6014 (0.0984) -0.9480 (0.5791) 297 [0.142] 
2005 0.5248 (0.1119) 0.4483 (0.0834) 0.7061 (0.7497) 297 [0.149] 
2006 0.4669 (0.1030) 0.5136 (0.0972) -0.1314 (0.4874) 297 [0.143] 
2007 0.4275 (0.0622) 0.6345 (0.0987) -0.8149 (0.4502) 297 [0.140] 
2008 0.2847 (0.0785) 0.6772 (0.0947) -1.4978 (0.7537) 297 [0.143] 
2009 0.6224 (0.1592) 1.0534 (0.1257) -1.8585 (0.5704) 297 [0.154] 
2010 0.5686 (0.1368) 0.5914 (0.0981) 0.1094 (0.7150) 297 [0.158] 
2011 0.8099 (0.1429) 0.6037 (0.1136) 0.3537 (0.9153) 297 [0.198] 
 
Fixed effects IV estimation results of model (5) with ݇ ൌ 1 and distance (and its squared term), common 
border, common languages, the (log of) the size of the partner country and membership to WTO as 
external instruments. Coefficients in bold and italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent nominal level (or better), respectively. Robust standard errors obtained via clustering of the 
residual along the reporting country dimension in parentheses. p-value associated to the Hansen-J 
statistics for the null of no correlation between instruments and the disturbance process (jp) in square 
brackets.  
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Table A.3 – Core EMU countries vs EMU and non-EMU partners 
 
γ1  γ2  γ3  N jp 
1988 0.2775 (0.1321) 0.7450 (0.1234) -1.2198 (0.6422) 275 [0.170] 
1989 0.2197 (0.1058) -0.1080 (0.0776) 2.7121 (0.5676) 275 [0.140] 
1990 0.5746 (0.2259) 0.5645 (0.1037) 0.2446 (1.0105) 286 [0.249] 
1991 0.4939 (0.1505) -0.5019 (0.2644) 6.6094 (1.2628) 286 [0.144] 
1992 0.7163 (0.0551) 0.8849 (0.1361) -0.4093 (0.6775) 289 [0.321] 
1993 0.3301 (0.0890) 1.6394 (0.2060) -6.3072 (1.1519) 296 [0.156] 
1994 0.6352 (0.1641) 1.4975 (0.1685) -3.7533 (1.3506) 296 [0.141] 
1995 0.7368 (0.1536) 0.9008 (0.1488) -0.4328 (1.2097) 297 [0.154] 
1996 0.6328 (0.2641) 0.6994 (0.1678) -0.4364 (1.5792) 297 [0.141] 
1997 0.6042 (0.2554) 0.1485 (0.1326) 1.9735 (1.1593) 297 [0.151] 
1998 0.3560 (0.1936) 0.9995 (0.1209) -3.2169 (0.9196) 297 [0.157] 
1999 0.2720 (0.1323) 0.5087 (0.1588) -1.1070 (0.8835) 297 [0.161] 
2000 0.6699 (0.1201) 0.7455 (0.2043) -0.6634 (1.2757) 297 [0.144] 
2001 0.5159 (0.0978) 0.3421 (0.1153) 0.8815 (0.7937) 297 [0.150] 
2002 0.6589 (0.1644) 0.5097 (0.1895) 0.8442 (1.3030) 297 [0.187] 
2003 1.0791 (0.0997) 0.5896 (0.2156) 2.5400 (1.2836) 297 [0.191] 
2004 0.3902 (0.1341) 0.5424 (0.1141) -0.6130 (0.8992) 297 [0.151] 
2005 0.5182 (0.1029) 0.4510 (0.1190) 0.8928 (0.8355) 297 [0.159] 
2006 0.5477 (0.0438) 0.4843 (0.0913) 0.5930 (0.4464) 297 [0.146] 
2007 0.3519 (0.0704) 0.6504 (0.0862) -1.0881 (0.5327) 297 [0.140] 
2008 0.3364 (0.0983) 0.7173 (0.0852) -1.4087 (0.7329) 297 [0.149] 
2009 0.4028 (0.0589) 1.1029 (0.102) -2.8885 (0.4226) 297 [0.167] 
2010 0.8986 (0.0728) 0.6539 (0.0900) 0.8932 (0.5444) 297 [0.156] 
2011 1.1856 (0.0669) 0.5652 (0.0835) 1.7494 (0.3797) 297 [0.198] 
 
Fixed effects IV estimation results of model (5) with ݇ ൌ 2 and distance (and its squared term), common 
border, common languages, the (log of) the size of the partner country and membership to WTO as 
external instruments. Coefficients in bold and italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent nominal level (or better), respectively. Robust standard errors obtained via clustering of the 
residual along the reporting country dimension in parentheses. p-value associated to the Hansen-J 
statistics for the null of no correlation between instruments and the disturbance process (jp) in square 
brackets.  
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Table A.4 – Peripheral EMU countries vs EMU and non-EMU partners 
 
γ1  γ2  γ3  N jp 
1988 0.1136 (0.2062) 0.7650 (0.1115) -2.6076 (1.2737) 275 [0.105] 
1989 0.0958 (0.1998) -0.0023 (0.0883) 1.5894 (1.0490) 275 [0.091] 
1990 0.8447 (0.1563) 0.5471 (0.0806) 2.0389 (1.296) 286 [0.156] 
1991 0.8750 (0.2327) -0.3875 (0.1873) 9.3323 (1.9039) 286 [0.107] 
1992 1.1457 (0.0669) 0.8974 (0.1194) 1.5096 (0.9222) 289 [0.204] 
1993 1.0426 (0.2465) 1.5137 (0.1842) -2.4936 (1.7038) 296 [0.106] 
1994 1.1201 (0.2736) 1.4864 (0.1271) -2.1471 (1.7653) 296 [0.090] 
1995 1.0676 (0.3610) 0.9690 (0.0953) 0.1362 (2.0635) 297 [0.107] 
1996 1.0337 (0.4490) 0.7565 (0.1313) 0.7176 (2.5607) 297 [0.091] 
1997 1.0014 (0.3913) 0.1786 (0.1301) 4.2285 (1.8550) 297 [0.108] 
1998 0.4510 (0.3688) 0.9796 (0.0976) -3.2131 (1.6477) 297 [0.104] 
1999 0.7769 (0.2369) 0.5242 (0.1305) 1.0264 (0.9609) 297 [0.151] 
2000 0.6784 (0.3678) 0.7903 (0.1368) -1.5251 (1.8731) 297 [0.094] 
2001 -0.1495 (0.2273) 0.4190 (0.0736) -3.6180 (1.2032) 297 [0.115] 
2002 0.3144 (0.3308) 0.6382 (0.1303) -2.7378 (1.9062) 297 [0.560] 
2003 0.1078 (0.4052) 0.8165 (0.1342) -5.0900 (2.4169) 297 [0.155] 
2004 0.2712 (0.2230) 0.5826 (0.0917) -2.0346 (1.3887) 297 [0.099] 
2005 0.3247 (0.3737) 0.5616 (0.0852) -1.4465 (2.3182) 297 [0.101] 
2006 0.1302 (0.2503) 0.5681 (0.0752) -2.5437 (1.3495) 297 [0.095] 
2007 0.4425 (0.1586) 0.6459 (0.0749) -1.0118 (0.8177) 297 [0.090] 
2008 0.1044 (0.1777) 0.6835 (0.0736) -2.5963 (0.9627) 297 [0.093] 
2009 0.7782 (0.3262) 1.0496 (0.0863) -1.3558 (1.3132) 297 [0.141] 
2010 0.2201 (0.1575) 0.5800 (0.1051) -1.2447 (0.9829) 297 [0.106] 
2011 0.4733 (0.3156) 0.4764 (0.0941) 0.1079 (1.8106) 297 [0.117] 
 
Fixed effects IV estimation results of model (5) with ݇ ൌ 3 and distance (and its squared term), common 
border, common languages, the (log of) the size of the partner country and membership to WTO as 
external instruments. Coefficients in bold and italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent nominal level (or better), respectively. Robust standard errors obtained via clustering of the 
residual along the reporting country dimension in parentheses. p-value associated to the Hansen-J 
statistics for the null of no correlation between instruments and the disturbance process (jp) in square 
brackets.  
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Table A.5 – Core EMU country pairs vs other EMU and non-EMU partners 
 
γ1  γ2  γ3  N jp 
1988 0.3049 (0.1123) 0.8323 (0.1212) -1.9521 (0.7656) 275 [0.189] 
1989 0.0954 (0.0502) -0.0440 (0.0659) 1.6830 (0.3887) 275 [0.140] 
1990 0.7484 (0.1786) 0.6069 (0.0905) 0.4351 (1.0560) 286 [0.249] 
1991 1.4512 (0.2613) -0.3046 (0.1983) 8.1986 (1.9550) 286 [0.151] 
1992 1.3304 (0.1424) 0.9449 (0.1299) 1.2773 (0.8639) 289 [0.335] 
1993 0.2297 (0.1652) 1.6880 (0.2057) -7.2381 (1.1232) 296 [0.154] 
1994 0.5313 (0.2083) 1.5526 (0.1596) -4.7567 (1.2711) 296 [0.140] 
1995 0.5267 (0.2042) 0.9140 (0.1353) -1.3203 (1.1186) 297 [0.159] 
1996 0.4507 (0.2979) 0.6816 (0.1549) -0.9431 (1.5157) 297 [0.142] 
1997 0.5490 (0.1511) 0.1225 (0.1246) 2.0450 (0.7878) 297 [0.155] 
1998 0.3182 (0.2500) 0.9823 (0.1016) -3.1672 (1.2110) 297 [0.156] 
1999 -0.1834 (0.1018) 0.4803 (0.1408) -2.4942 (0.7400) 297 [0.156] 
2000 0.6018 (0.1622) 0.7032 (0.1781) -0.5002 (1.2179) 297 [0.147] 
2001 0.1494 (0.0935) 0.3158 (0.0984) -0.2423 (0.6555) 297 [0.165] 
2002 0.3384 (0.2000) 0.4906 (0.1695) -0.1603 (1.1512) 297 [0.358] 
2003 0.5432 (0.2251) 0.5659 (0.1942) 0.8465 (1.2596) 297 [0.185] 
2004 0.3721 (0.2572) 0.5618 (0.1108) -0.9439 (1.1637) 297 [0.151] 
2005 0.4135 (0.1695) 0.4753 (0.1130) 0.3146 (0.8471) 297 [0.151] 
2006 0.4038 (0.0809) 0.4970 (0.0884) -0.0394 (0.5452) 297 [0.143] 
2007 0.6043 (0.0980) 0.6701 (0.0846) -0.4593 (0.5973) 297 [0.141] 
2008 0.2424 (0.0911) 0.7019 (0.0913) -1.4930 (0.7107) 297 [0.150] 
2009 1.0193 (0.0711) 1.1445 (0.1019) -1.1818 (0.4677) 297 [0.180] 
2010 -0.0120 (0.1389) 0.6307 (0.1089) -2.2111 (0.6796) 297 [0.160] 
2011 0.0822 (0.0789) 0.4526 (0.1114) -0.9951 (0.5227) 297 [0.192] 
 
Fixed effects IV estimation results of model (5) with ݇ ൌ 4 and distance (and its squared term), common 
border, common languages, the (log of) the size of the partner country and membership to WTO as 
external instruments. Coefficients in bold and italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent nominal level (or better), respectively. Robust standard errors obtained via clustering of the 
residual along the reporting country dimension in parentheses. p-value associated to the Hansen-J 
statistics for the null of no correlation between instruments and the disturbance process (jp) in square 
brackets.  
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Table A.6 – Peripheral EMU country pairs vs other EMU and non-EMU partners 
 
γ1  γ2  γ3  N jp 
1988 0.2933 (0.2633) 0.8066 (0.0969) -2.0424 (1.6380) 275 [0.138] 
1989 0.1025 (0.2275) 0.0796 (0.0585) 0.5406 (1.2288) 275 [0.091] 
1990 0.8116 (0.2254) 0.5844 (0.0598) 1.5792 (0.9045) 286 [0.184] 
1991 -0.1926 (0.1248) -0.2115 (0.1292) 2.2180 (0.9399) 286 [0.146] 
1992 0.9535 (0.2318) 0.8886 (0.1094) 1.3360 (1.7636) 289 [0.225] 
1993 1.4645 (0.4872) 1.5169 (0.1779) 0.2418 (3.3218) 296 [0.106] 
1994 1.3410 (0.4727) 1.4720 (0.1286) -0.5668 (3.1177) 296 [0.092] 
1995 1.5538 (0.5163) 0.9449 (0.1162) 2.9651 (2.8645) 297 [0.106] 
1996 1.3934 (0.4732) 0.7018 (0.1411) 3.0462 (2.5151) 297 [0.092] 
1997 1.1264 (0.3736) 0.1734 (0.1246) 4.8048 (1.5877) 297 [0.111] 
1998 0.6822 (0.3197) 0.9432 (0.0858) -1.8105 (1.2353) 297 [0.102] 
1999 1.0504 (0.3338) 0.5178 (0.1225) 2.1818 (1.2361) 297 [0.123] 
2000 0.8296 (0.3297) 0.7224 (0.1485) -0.1651 (1.7289) 297 [0.102] 
2001 -0.3261 (0.2459) 0.3766 (0.0933) -4.2124 (1.2504) 297 [0.120] 
2002 0.1803 (0.2523) 0.5763 (0.1538) -3.1697 (1.0426) 297 [0.667] 
2003 -0.4487 (0.3702) 0.7379 (0.1723) -8.0547 (1.8545) 297 [0.118] 
2004 0.1105 (0.1964) 0.5590 (0.0973) -2.8363 (1.0769) 297 [0.096] 
2005 0.3593 (0.3560) 0.5554 (0.1006) -1.5593 (2.1000) 297 [0.098] 
2006 -0.0576 (0.2641) 0.5581 (0.0749) -3.8833 (1.3220) 297 [0.096] 
2007 0.4196 (0.1798) 0.6537 (0.0686) -1.2855 (1.1903) 297 [0.090] 
2008 0.2511 (0.2470) 0.7038 (0.0665) -2.0029 (1.2893) 297 [0.094] 
2009 0.4756 (0.1058) 1.0805 (0.0755) -3.2259 (0.5244) 297 [0.151] 
2010 -0.0593 (0.4296) 0.6424 (0.0986) -3.5751 (2.6635) 297 [0.108] 
2011 0.5069 (0.5688) 0.4746 (0.0848) 0.4335 (3.2347) 297 [0.121] 
 
Fixed effects IV estimation results of model (5) with ݇ ൌ 5 and distance (and its squared term), common 
border, common languages, the (log of) the size of the partner country and membership to WTO as 
external instruments. Coefficients in bold and italics indicate statistical significance at the 5 and 10 
percent nominal level (or better), respectively. Robust standard errors obtained via clustering of the 
residual along the reporting country dimension in parentheses. p-value associated to the Hansen-J 
statistics for the null of no correlation between instruments and the disturbance process (jp) in square 
brackets.  
